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The Welfare Effects of Pfiesteria-Related Fish Kills:  








We used contingent behavior analysis to study the effects of pfiesteria-related fish kills 
on the demand for seafood in the Mid-Atlantic region.  We estimated a set demand 
difference models based on individual responses to questions about seafood consumption 
in the presence of fish kills and with different amounts of information provided about 
health risks.  We used a random-effects Tobit model to control for correlation across each 
observation and to account for censoring.  We found that 1) pfiesteria-related fish kills 
had a significant negative effect on the demand for seafood even though the fish kills 
pose no known threat to consumers through seafood consumption, 2) seafood consumers 
were not responsive to expert risk information designed to reassure them that seafood is 
safe in the presence of a fish kill, and 3) a mandatory seafood inspection program largely 
eliminated the welfare loss incurred due to misinformation.   
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1.  Introduction 
          Pfiesteria piscicida is a single-celled microorganism, a toxic dinoflagellate, found 
in the sediments of many estuaries in the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States.  It has 
been identified as the cause of many fish kills in this region.  Thousands, even millions, 
of fish can die in a single kill.   
          During periods of warm weather and high nutrient concentrations, pfiesteria 
becomes a toxic predator to certain species of fish.  While the scientific evidence 
suggests that these outbreaks are lethal to the fish, they appear to pose no health risk to 
humans in the seafood market.  Nevertheless, media coverage of pfiesteria-related fish 
kills has led to rather large reductions in seafood consumption during periods of an 
outbreak.  The associated loss in economic welfare is potentially quite large and is 
seemingly due to misinformation.   
          In this paper we measure the welfare effects of a hypothetical pfiesteria outbreak 
using contingent behavior analysis in a seafood demand model.  We also consider the 
effects of different forms of information provision on attenuating the losses due to 
misinformation.     
          Our research follows a framework developed by Shulstad and Stoevener (1978) 
who measured the welfare losses incurred by Oregon’s pheasant hunters in reaction to 
news of mercury contamination in pheasants. Since then, researchers have considered the 
impact of news-induced ‘health scares’ on the demand for a variety of goods.  See, for 
example, Swartz and Strand (1981), Smith et al. (1988), Brown and Schrader (1990), 
Wessels et al. (1994), and Wessels et. al. (1995).  Ours is the first to consider pfiesteria-  4
related fish kills and the first to use contingent behavior techniques to elicit consumers’ 
stated preferences in this context. We begin with a brief discussion of our survey and 
study design before turning to the model.  
           
2.  Survey and Study Design 
          Contingent behavior or stated preference techniques are often used to measure 
consumer preferences.  Individuals are asked to respond to survey questions pertaining to 
a market or non-market good. The provision of the good is altered in some fashion and 
the respondents are asked how they might respond to that change. In our case, 
respondents are asked how their seafood consumption might change in the presence of a 
pfiesteria-related fish kill.   
          We conducted a phone-mail-phone survey of seafood consumers over the age of 18 
in Delaware, Maryland, Washington DC, Virginia, and North Carolina in 2001. The 
sample frame was stratified based on a 50/50 split between North Carolina and the other 
four areas.                
          The initial phone survey was designed to collect information on seafood 
consumption patterns, costs, knowledge of pfiesteria, and socioeconomic information. In 
addition, each respondent was asked how their number of seafood meals consumed 
(monthly) would change if the price of seafood were to rise and to fall.  These contingent 
behavior questions were designed to infer the slope of the seafood demand function. The 
actual questions appear in Table 1 as Questions 1 and 2.    5
          Individuals were recruited in the initial phone survey to participate in a follow-up 
phone survey.  Between phone calls, individuals were sent a packet of materials which 
included 
  information describing pfiesteria and its health risks 
  information describing typical pfesteria-related fish kills  
  a hypothetical press release describing a pfesteria-related fish kill 
  a two-sided color pamphlet describing a new seafood inspection program 
 
          The information describing pfiesteria and its health risks came in three different 
forms: (i) no information, (ii) a brochure, or (iii) a brochure and insert. Each respondent 
received one or the other of these packets split about equally across our sample. The 
brochure explains what pfiesteria is and notes that the risks of eating seafood are not 
changed as a result of the fish kills related to pfiesteria outbreaks.  The insert is more 
direct and emphasizes that there is no scientific evidence linking pfiesteria outbreaks to 
increased health risks in seafood consumption. The press release described either a major 
or a minor kill.  A major kill involved hundreds of thousands of fish over a large area of a 
river.  A minor kill involved fewer fish over a smaller area.  Each respondent received 
one or the other of these press releases again split about equally across our sample. The 
text of the information sent to respondents appears in the Appendix (For the actual color 
versions with photographs, please contact the authors.)       
          The second phone survey then focused on three contingent behavior questions: 
Questions 3, 4, and 5 in Table 1. Question 3 asked individuals how they would change 
their seafood consumption if the pfiesteria-related fish kill reported in the press release 
were to occur.  Question 4 asked the same question, but told respondents to assume that   6
the government safety inspection program described in the pamphlet was in operation.   
Question 5 asked the same question but told respondents that the safety program was in 
operation and that the price of seafood would increase as a result.  These questions were 
designed to ascertain whether the seafood demand function shifted in the presence of a 
fish kill and if the inspection program attenuated that shift.  The different treatments also 
allowed us to examine the extent to which demand shifts differ with different size fish 
kills and different information provided about health risks.   
          The first phone survey generated a sample of 1,790 respondents. The response rate 
was 61% -- completed interviews divided by contacts where contacts include refusals and 
completed interviews.  Of these 1,790 respondents, 845 completed the second phone 
interview -- a response rate of 47%.   Table 2 shows some selected sample statistics on 
our population. All statistics are weighted to account for the sample stratification.  There 
was some item non-response over the contingent behavior questions, so the sample size 
over the questions is slightly unbalanced, but this is quite small.   
           
3.  Model 
Utility Theory and Demand Model 
          We treat a pfiesteria-related fish kill as a factor affecting an individual’s perception 
of the health risks associated with consuming fish.  That perception, in turn, affects the 
individual’s demand for seafood meals.  In our analysis a seafood consumer has an 
indirect utility function over a fixed time period of the form 
(1)      (,,,( ) ;) vv p q y h = sc,                                                             7
where p is the price of a seafood meal, q is the price of a composite of all other goods, y 
is income for the relevant time period, h is the perceived quality of seafood, s is a vector 
of attributes that govern an individual’s perception of quality, and c is a vector of 
individual characteristics accounting for heterogeneity of the population.  Following 
conventional consumer theory, we expect  









The term si is one of i elements in the vector s.    The elements can affect perceived health 
risks positively or negatively and in our application will pertain to the hypothetical 
pfesteria-related fish kill and information on the health risked associated with a kill 
presented in our contingent behavior question. Recall that our population includes 
seafood consumers only.  For people who do not consume seafood, the term h(s) is 
unlikely to enter the utility function.                                                                                                 
          Roy’s Identity implies an uncompensated demand function for seafood meals of 
the form  








In our application we use linear forms for h(s) and  (,,,( ) ;) xpqyhsc to estimate seafood 
demand and the impact of fish-kills on demand
1 
(3)     h ′ = α s 
                                                 
1 We also considered a semi-log form for x(.).  The results were so similar to the linear model that we 
choose to present the simpler one only.    8
(4)      ( ). pqyh xp y q ββββ =+++′′ c + α s β c   
              Now, consider the contingent behavior questions for a change in the price of 
seafood.  Individuals are asked how much their quantity demanded would change with a 
hypothetical change in price.  Let  x ∆ be the reported change in the quantity demanded 
and  p ∆ be the size of the hypothetical price change.  
          In terms of our demand model, we have 
(5)      0 pqyh xp y q ββββ ′′ =+ + + + c α s β c      
as the quantity demanded at the current price p. And,  
(6)      1 () pq y h xp p y q ββ β β ′ ′ =+ ∆ + ++ + c α s β c        
as the quantity demanded at the new price  p p +∆ .  Subtracting equation (5) from 
equation (6) gives a demand-difference  
(7)      p x p β ∆= ∆    
where 10 x xx ∆= − is the reported change in the quantity consumed in response to the 
hypothetical price increase.  The term ( ) ( ) qyh qq yy β ββ ′ ′ − +− + + d α (s-s) β (d-d)drops 
out of the demand difference by design.   In the contingent behavior question there is no 
variation in income, other prices, risk factors, or individual characteristics between the 
current state and the hypothetical state. 
          We estimate p β using equation (7).  Variation in price comes from the survey 
design – individuals receive different  's p ∆  in the contingent behavior questions. For a   9
price increase  p ∆  takes on a value of either $1, $3, $5, or $7 (Question 1 in Table 1).  
For a price decrease it takes on a value of $-1, $-2, $-3, or $-4 (Question 2 in Table 1).  
           We estimated separate equations for price-up and price-down.  These are   
 (8)     
11
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Recall that everyone in the sample is asked both questions, so the equations in (8) are 
over the same people. The error terms are assumed to be correlated across observations 
and truncated such that individuals cannot reduce their consumption beyond what they 
presently eat (eg., an individual cannot reduce the number meals consumed by 5 if 
current consumption is only 3 meals).     
          The method is the same for estimating shifts in demand due to the fish kill and 
inspection programs analyzed in last three contingent behavior questions.  In this case, 
we have 
(9)      0 pqyh xp y q ββββ ′′ =+ + + + c α s β c      
as the quantity demanded without the fish kill, and  
(10)      1 ) pqyh xp y q ββββ ′ =+ + + + ′ + c s ∆s β α (c  
as the quantity demanded with the hypothetical fish kill. ∆sis a vector of the change in 
the factors that affect perceptions of risk.  Subtracting equation (9) from equation (10) 
gives  
(11)      h x β ∆= ′∆s α    10
10 x xx ∆= − is the reported change in the quantity consumed in response to the 
hypothetical fish kill and  ( ) ( ) ( ) pq y pp qq yy β ββ ′ −+ −+ −+ c β (c-c)drops out of the 
demand difference since there is no change in  and , , ,    p qy cbetween the current and 
hypothetical states in the contingent behavior question.  The elements in s, however, do 
change and this gives rise to the specification in equation (11). 
          The vector ∆sincludes the following elements in our application 
             major-kill (=1 if the fish kill is major in the hypothetical press release)
             minor-kill (=1 if the fish kill is minor in the hypothetical press release)
      brochure (=1 if  = ∆s  the respondent recevied a brochure only)
             brochure & insert (=1 if the respondent received a brochure and an insert)
             inspection (=1 if the insepection program is operational)
             price for inspection (= price of the inspection program per seafood meal).
 
All other elements in s that affect perceptions of health risk are assumed to be constant.     
          The coefficients on major-kill and minor-kill, are expected to be negative.  The 
hypothesis is that individuals have misperceptions about the dangers of seafood 
consumption -- believing it is dangerous to eat after a pfiesteria-related fish kill when in 
fact the dangers are slight.    
          The coefficients on brochure, brochure & insert, and inspection are expected to be 
positive – information on risks shifts demand “back” to the right. The hypothesis is that 
the safety information counters the misperception of seafood health risks and reduces the 
extent of the leftward shift. The latter is a recovery of lost welfare due to poor 
information.  Introduction of a seafood inspection program, inspection, would also 
presumably work to shift demand “back” to the right.  And finally, the coefficient on 
price for inspection, is expected to be negative dampening the extent of the rightward   11
shift since consumers realize they have to pay for the program. 
          Now, consider Question 3 in Table 1.  Individuals face either a major or a minor 
fish kill and are given one of three levels of information: (i) no information, (ii) a 
brochure, or (iii) a brochure and an insert.  This gives rise to the following form of our 
demand-difference  







x major-kill +  minor-kill
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In Question 4, everyone is asked how their response to Question 3 would differ if a 
seafood inspection program had been in place. The other right hand side variables are the 
same as before.  Question 5 is the same as 4 except that individuals are told that the 
inspection program will increase the price.  The price increase may be $1, $3, $5, or $7.   
          The equations for Questions 4 and 5 then are 
(13)    
41 2 3 4
54
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Q h
x  major-kill minor-kill
   
brochure brochure insert
          + inspection
βα βα βα βα
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(14)    
51 2 3 4
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& Qh h h h
hQ h
x  major-kill minor-kill
   
brochure brochure insert
          + inspection price for inspection
βα βα βα βα
βα βα ε




      
In estimation we stack equations (8), (12), (13), and (14) giving a basic linear model with 
8 parameters to be estimated. The eight parameters are 16 and through ,,        pu pd h h β ββ α β α .  
Since the individual parameters  h β and  i α are not identified in our model, we 
estimate hi β α as a single parameter for each i.   This has no bearing on our final welfare 
calculations. 
           Stacking allows us to constrain parameters across equations to be constant and to   12
estimate the model with random effects. Random effects allows the error terms in the 
model to be correlated across equations for each observation.  It stands to reason that the 
same unobserved elements that influence an individual’s shift in demand due to a fish kill 
without an inspection program will also influence that individual’s shift with an 
inspection program in place. Since all observations in the sample do not make it to the 
second survey and since there is some attrition due to simple cleaning of the data, an 
unbalanced version of a random effects model is estimated.  
          The model is also estimated as a Tobit regression with censoring at  x − , the 
negative of the quantity consumed. This is because individuals cannot reduce their 
consumption of fish by more than the quantity consumed.  Since individuals consume 
different quantities, the censoring point varies across observations.   
 Demand Model with Interactions  
          The effects of a price change and perceived heath risk may vary with income and 
other individual characteristics.  For example, if income enters equation (4) interacted 
with p and s, we have  
(15)      { } () () pqy p y hh y xp y p y qy ββββ β β ′ =+++ + + ⋅ + ′′ ⋅ c β α sc α s ,      
and the demand-differences for slope and shift changes become 










′ ∆= ∆+ ⋅ α∆ s
.          
In this case, the change in seafood meals consumed in response to a price change or fish 
kill varies with a person’s income. We estimated a model that included three interactions:   13
income (income), a dummy variable for residing in North Carolina (NC), and a dummy 
variable for having consumed a species of fish likely to be viewed as unrelated to the 
threat of the fish kill (other-fish).  The species included in other-fish are King mackerel, 
Mahi-mahi, Orange Roughy, Pollock, Salmon, Shark, Swordfish, Tuna, Whitefish, 
Whiting, Lobster, Shrimp, and Scallops. 
          
Consumer Surplus 
          An individual’s monthly consumer surplus for seafood meals is   









                                                                               
We estimatecsfor each observation using the reported level of monthly consumption (x) 
and the estimated value of  p β  from the relevant model.  For surplus measures in per 
meal terms we divide cs  by x, the number of meals consumed per month. 
          The change in consumer surplus for a hypothetical fish kill is 
 












                                                                    
       
This is simply the difference in the consumer surplus with and without the kill. This is 
sometimes called avoidance cost – an individual’s cost of avoiding fish after a kill.   14
 
4.  Results 
          The regression results appear in Tables 3 and 4.  These are random effects Tobit 
regressions with censoring at the negative of the number of meals consumed. Consumer 
surplus measures per month appear in Table 5.  The results are shown for two models: a 
basic model and a general model (includes interactions).    
          Table 5 includes the total surplus per seafood meal and the change in surplus due a 
fish kill per seafood meal under different scenarios. We report avoidance costs separately 
for major and minor kills for both models assuming (i) individuals have no information, 
(ii) individuals have a brochure, (iii) individuals have a brochure and an insert, (iv) an 
inspection program is in place, and (v) an inspection program is in place and there is a 
price rise.   
         There are several noteworthy findings.  First, the effects of a price increase and a 
price decrease differ – the slope of the demand function is larger for a decrease than for 
an increase.  In the basic model the coefficient on  down p ∆ is -.346, and the coefficient on 
up p ∆  is -.218.  The relative difference is about the same in the model with interactions, 
and the absolute value of the coefficients is larger. In effect, there is a “kink” in the 
demand function at the point of current consumption.  Quantity demanded seems to be 
more responsive to a price decreases than price increases.  This finding appears to be 
consistent with theories of loss aversion – that individuals value losses more highly than 
gains of equivalent magnitude.  One may be inclined to argue that this is due to 
individuals’ inability to reduce consumption beyond their current level thereby capping 
the response to price increases.  However, keep in mind that we have estimated a Tobit   15
version of the model that accounts for truncation at current consumption.   
          In our calculation of consumer surplus the coefficient on price appears in the 
denominator of our surplus measures (see equations (17)-(18)).  In Table 5 we report 
welfare changes using the price-up coefficient since all the measures of surplus we 
consider are integrated over the portion of the demand curve corresponding to a price 
increase.    
          Second, the coefficients on major-kill and minor-kill are negative and significant as 
expected. This general result is supported by other studies (see, Anderson (1991) or 
Ahluwalia et. al. (2000)).  What is unexpected is that the effect of a major kill and a 
minor kill are about the same.  There is no statistical difference in their coefficients.  The 
implication is that the size and scope of a fish kill is not particularly important.  Hundreds 
of thousands of dead fish signal an increase in health risk comparable to ten of thousands 
of dead fish. An alternative interpretation is that our contingent behavior survey failed to 
pass a scope test (see Hanemann (1994, p.34)). 
          The avoidance cost associated with the fish kills are reported in Table 5. Ignoring 
for the moment the cases with information provision and inspection programs, the 
avoidance cost per meal with a minor or major fish kill is on the order of $3 to $4 per 
meal.  
          Third, information provision in the form of a brochure or a brochure along with 
insert appears to have limited sway on consumers.  The coefficient on brochure is 
statistically insignificant and has the ‘wrong’ sign in both models.  The coefficient on 
brochure & inset is statistically insignificant in the basic model and significant in the 
model with interactions.  However, in combination with the interactions, the effect of   16
inspection is an insignificant shift in the ‘wrong’ direction as shown in the welfare 
measures.  The avoidance cost associated with the fish kills assuming individuals have a 
brochure or have a brochure and the insert then is about the same as the cost with no 
information. Again, see Table 5.  This finding seems to suggest that simply providing 
information based on experts’ judgments carries little weight in altering individuals’ 
perceptions.  It is also possible that the manner in which the information was packaged 
and presented was the cause for the limited impact – people ignored it or found that it 
lacked credibility. For a discussion of the credibility of the sources of information for 
example see Hovland and Warren (1969), and Sternthal et al. (1978). 
          These coefficients seem to be in line with the argument that positive information 
has less of an effect on consumer behavior than negative media coverage.  The ‘negative’ 
press releases shifted demand significantly; the ‘positive’ brochures shifted it only 
slightly. Kroloff (1988) found that the impact of media exposure gives negative news 
quadruple weight compared with positive news. Sherrell et al. (1985) calculated that it 
takes five times more positive information to offset the effects of any negative 
information. 
          Fourth, the presence of an inspection program, unlike information provision, shifts 
the demand function significantly rightward – returning it close to its pre-fish kill 
position.  The coefficient on inspection nearly perfectly offsets the initial shift due to the 
hypothetical fish kill.  The coefficient is also statistically significant.  This result is 
consistent with Wessels and Anderson (1995) who considered the role of a variety of 
measures of providing seafood safety assurances and found that consumers placed a high 
value on seafood inspection programs. So, the cost of the kill, with an inspection program   17
in place, drops dramatically as shown in Table 5.  
          Fifth, the impact of a rise in seafood prices due to an inspection program is about 
the same as a general price rise – a sensible result. The coefficient on  up p ∆  is -.218 and 
on price of inspection is -.183 in the basic model, and -.30 and -.27 in the general model.  
This has the potential of offsetting some of the recaptured losses by the inspection 
program.  In Table 5 we present the welfare loss for a fish kill assuming an inspection 
program is in place and raises the price of fish $1.   
          Sixth, incorporating interactions into the demand difference model has little effect 
on our qualitative or quantitative results.  We introduced three interactive variables, 
income, a dummy for residence in North Carolina, and a dummy for consumption of non-
threatened fish.  Our intention was to see whether or not the relevant slopes and shifts in 
seafood demand would vary with these covariates.  The three covariates added 24 new 
parameters to the demand difference model.  Of these, only three were statistically 
significant.    
          We included the income variable reasoning that the effects of price changes may be 
different across different income groups and that the response to fish kills and 
information provision may differ across classes.  Our results show some evidence of 
varying responses to price but not to information provision.  Higher income groups 
appear to be less responsive to price increases and more responsive to price decreases 
then lower income groups.   
          The dummy for residence in North Carolina (NC) was included to pick up any 
difference that may occur between northern and southern respondents.  Given differences 
in the populations and location of the fish kill, it seems likely that there may be a   18
difference in the demand slopes and shifts.   This does not appear to be the case.  None of 
the North Carolina interactions in the linear model are significant.  The signs imply that 
North Carolina residents are generally less responsive to counter information than 
northern residents and more responsive to price declines.  Otherwise, the slopes and 
demand shifts appear to be about the same across the two areas. 
         Finally, we include a dummy for consumption of a species of fish thought to be 
unrelated to our kill scenarios.  Our reasoning here is that individuals who consume such 
fish may be less inclined to alter their consumption of fish in response to the kill since 
their preferred species are less likely to be involved in the kill and perceived as being 
associated with the attendant risks.  There is some weak evidence of this effect.  The 
coefficients on other-fish when interacted with major-kill are positive with some 
statistical significance.  Again, the other-fish variable has drawbacks.  First, anyone can 
switch to a non-threatened species and thereby not reduce overall consumption.  And 
second, which species people actually perceived as threatened may diverge from our list.   
 
5.  Conclusions 
          As expected, individuals react to fish kills by reducing consumption of fish even 
though the nature of the fish kill is unlikely to pose increased health risks. This result has 
been documented elsewhere in the literature and suggests that there may be a role for 
government in providing information to consumers about risks.   
          When individuals reduce seafood consumption they are said to incur “avoidance 
costs.”  If the real risk of eating seafood is low, these avoidance costs are in a sense 
incurred mistakenly by individuals.  The benefit of a government information program   19
then is the avoidance cost saved by informing consumers. The avoidance costs in 
question here appears to be rather large.  Using our model, the aggregate cost over the 
four state region is on the order of $100 million per month depending on the amount of 
risk information provided to individuals.     
         We found that consumers were not responsive to “expert” risk information sent in a 
mail packet in the form of a brochure.  The brochure emphasized that eating fish after a 
kill was safe.  For the most part, individuals behaved as they would have without the 
information.  Hence, the savings in avoidance cost was small.  Perhaps experts have little 
sway in how individuals form perceptions of risk.  Or, perhaps our information packets 
and method of dissemination failed to communicate the risk meaningfully or individuals 
simply ignore it. 
          On the other hand, we found that consumers were quite responsive to seafood 
inspection programs.  Avoidance costs are nearly eliminated by the hypothetical program 
used in our experiment.  This suggests that consumers have confidence in such programs 
and that concrete action by government authorities can affect consumer decisions. But, 
we also found the much of gain in surplus realized by such programs can easily dissipate 
if individuals believe it will lead to a rise, even a small rise, in the price of fish.   
          There were a number of other interesting findings.  Individuals did not seem to 
differentiate between major and minor sized fish kills.  We surmised that there is some 
threshold level that triggers a response by consumers and that our kills surpassed that 
threshold. We also found the people responded asymmetrically to price increases and 
price decreases – people were more responsive to price decreases.     20
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TABLE 1 








  Price up 
 
Seafood prices change over time.  For example, if a lot of fish are caught, prices go down.  When fewer 
fish are caught, prices go up.  Suppose the price of your portion of your average seafood meal goes up by 
$X but the price of all other foods stays the same.  Compared to the [NUMBER] meals you ate last month, 
do you think you would eat more, less, or the same number of meals next month with the higher price? (X 








 Price down 
 
Now suppose the price of your average seafood meal goes down by $X, but the price of all other foods 
stays the same.  Compared to the [NUMBER] meals you ate last month, do you think you would eat more, 









  Fish kill 
 
Thinking about seafood meals again, suppose that the average price of your seafood meals stays the same.  
Compared to the [NUMBER] meals you ate last month, do you think you would eat more, less, or the same 








 Fish kill with   
 Inspection 
 
Now suppose the average price of your seafood meals stays the same.  Compared to the [NUMBER] meals 
you ate last month, do you think you would eat more, less, or the same number next month after the fish 








 Fish kill with   
 inspection  
 and price 
  increase  
 
Suppose that with the mandatory seafood inspection program the price of your portion of your average 
seafood meal goes up by $X, but the price of all other food stays the same.  Compared to the [NUMBER] 
meals you ate last month, do you think that you would eat more, less, or the same number next month after 




About how many more/less seafood meals do you think you would eat next month? 
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TABLE 2   
DEMOGRAPHICS OF SAMPLE (n=1790) 
 
  Number of Respondents 
by State 
      
          
Delaware  236        
Maryland  218        
Virginia  218        
Washington DC  47        
North Carolina  1071        
          
Variable Description  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum   Maximum 
Income   Thousands of Dollars  54.28  26.13  5.00  100.00 
          
Age  Years 46.84  17.02  18.00  100.00 
          
Education  Number of years of 
education 
14.17 2.69  0.00  20.00 
          
Male  Male if equal to 1   0.36  0.48  0.00  1.00 
          
Household  Number of people in the 
household under the age 
of 18 
2.72 1.37  0.00  8.00 
          
Children  Number of children  0.72  1.04  0.00  5.00 
          
White  White if equal to 1  0.71  0.45  0.00  1.00 
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TABLE 3  
BASIC MODEL: REGRESSION RESULTS 
Random Effects Tobit Model with Censoring at the Negative  
of the Number Meals Purchased Per Month 
 
   Parameter Estimates for 
Equations 8, 12-14 
Variable   Coefficient  t-statistic 
      








major-kill  Dummy variable for 
major fish kill 
 
-1.19 8.0 
minor-kill  Dummy variable for 
minor fish kill 
 
-1.27 9.2 









inspection  Dummy variable for 




price for inspection  Amount of price 
increase due to 
seafood program 
-.183 6.8 
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TABLE 4  
GENERAL MODEL: 
 REGRESSION RESULTS 
Random Effects Tobit Model with Censoring at the Negative  
of the Number Meals Purchased Per Month 
 
   Parameter Estimates for 
Equations 8, 12-14 
Variable   Coefficient  t-statistic 
      








major-kill  Dummy variable 
for major fish kill 
 
-1.94 4.2 
minor-kill  Dummy variable 
for minor fish kill 
 
-1.25 2.8 





brochure & insert  Dummy variable 
for information 
insert include  
 
.82 2.0 
inspection  Dummy variable 
for inspection 
program in place 
 
1.31 2.8 
price for inspection  Amount of price 






up p ∆   * income  .0001 2.4 
  *NC  -.01 0.4 
  *other-fish  .02 0.6 
      
down p ∆   * income  -.001 1.2 
  *NC  .05 1.0 
  *other-fish  -.04 0.8 
        26
major-kill  * income  -.0006 0.1 
  *NC  .31 1.2 
  *other-fish  .64 1.9 
      
minor-kill  * income  -.005 0.8 
  *NC  -.03 0.1 
  *other-fish  .39 1.2 
      
brochure  * income  .01 1.7 
  *NC  .30 1.2 
  *other-fish  -.14 0.4 
      
brochure & insert  * income  -.005 1.0 
  *NC  -.61 0.2 
  *other-fish  -.25 0.8 
      
inspection  * income  -.001 0.3 
  *NC  -.27 1.0 
  *other-fish  -.28 0.9 
      
price of inspection  * income  .0006 0.6 
  *NC  .09 1.5 
  *other-fish  .03 0.5 










censored   -x   
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TABLE 5 
CONSUMER SURPLUS  
Total Consumer Surplus and 
Consumer Surplus Due to a Fish Kill Under Different Scenarios 










  Using price up coefficient  $11.24  $8.16   
  Using price down coefficient  $7.06  $5.80   
            
            
Change in consumer 
surplus due a fish 
kill 
  Major Fish Kill    Minor Fish Kill 
Scenario    Basic Model:  General Model: 
 
  Basic Model:  General Model: 
 
No information   -$4.17  -$2.70   -$4.34  -$2.95 
Brochure   -$4.38  -$2.32   -$4.54  -$2.62 
Brochure/counter   -$4.20  -$2.98   -$4.37  -$3.21 
SIP   -$0.60  -$1.07   -$0.92  -$1.42 
SIP + $1 price up   -$1.37  -$1.24   -$1.65  -$1.76 
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APPENDIX 
 
Text of Brochure 
What You Should Know About Pfiesteria 
This booklet provides information about some issues related to Pfiesteria. This booklet and our telephone interview 
with you will consider these issues because they are important to the economy of the Mid-Atlantic Region. Please 
carefully consider the information in this booklet before our telephone interview. You may also like to have it nearby 
during our telephone interview. 
What is Pfiesteria? 
Pfiesteria (fis-teer-ee-ah) is a potentially toxic organism that has been associated with fish kills in coastal waters from 
Delaware to North Carolina. A fish kill is a situation in which many fish -- more than a few dozen -- die within hours or 
days.   
Discovered in 1988, Pfiesteria has a 24 stage life-cycle. A few of these stages can produce toxins that affect fish. 
Pfiesteria is microscopic algae that is a natural part of the environment. 
How does Pfiesteria affect fish? 
Pfiesteria usually is in its non-toxic form, feeding on algae and bacteria in coastal rivers. Scientists believe that 
Pfiesteria only becomes toxic in the presence of a large number of fish. Pfiesteria cells then change form and stun the 
fish with a powerful toxin. The toxins are believed to cause lesions or sores.  
Pfiesteria is NOT an infection like bacteria or viruses. Fish are NOT killed by an infection of Pfiesteria. Fish are killed 
by the toxins Pfiesteria releases, or by other infections once the Pfiesteria toxins have caused sores to develop. Fish 
may also die from Pfiesteria toxins without developing sores. 
How long do toxic Pfiesteria outbreaks last?  
Toxic outbreaks of Pfiesteria are typically very short, no more than a few hours. After an outbreak, Pfiesteria cells 
change back into non-toxic forms very quickly, and the Pfiesteria toxins in the water go away within a few hours. 
However, Pfiesteria-associated fish sores or fish kills may continue for days or even weeks. 
Is Pfiesteria the only cause of fish sores and fish kills? 
Pfiesteria is only one cause of fish kills. Other causes include a lack of dissolved oxygen in the water, changes in water 
salinity or temperature, sewage or chemical spills, red or brown tides, infections, and other environmental changes. 
In addition, there are many possible causes for fish sores other than Pfiesteria. These include physical injury in nets or 
traps, bites by other fish or birds, poor water quality, and viruses or bacteria. 
Where has Pfiesteria been found?  
Pfiesteria has been found in coastal waters from Delaware Bay to North Carolina. It has not been found in freshwater 
lakes, streams, or other inland waters.  
Pfiesteria has been associated with major fish kills at many sites along the North Carolina coast, particularly the New, 
Neuse and Tar-Pamlico Rivers. Pfiesteria has been associated with fish kills in the Chicamacomico and Manokin 
Rivers and King's Creek in Maryland, and the lower Pocomoke River in Maryland and Virginia. Pfiesteria has been 
associated with fish sores in Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina.  
What causes toxic Pfiesteria outbreaks? 
Scientists generally agree that a large number of fish can make Pfiesteria become toxic. However, other factors may 
contribute to toxic Pfiesteria outbreaks. Pollutants are thought to help Pfiesteria grow by stimulating the growth of 
algae that Pfiesteria feeds on. Excess nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorus are common pollutants in coastal   29
waters. The main sources of nutrient pollution in coastal areas are sewage treatment plants, septic tanks, runoff from 
cities, suburbs and farms, and air pollutants that settle on the land and water. 
Can Pfiesteria cause human health problems? 
Any human health problems associated with Pfiesteria are from its release of toxins into coastal waters. Preliminary 
evidence suggests that exposure to waters where toxic forms of Pfiesteria are active may cause memory loss, confusion, 
and a variety of other symptoms including respiratory, skin, and gastrointestinal problems. It has been shown that 
similar human health effects can be caused by exposure to Pfiesteria toxins in laboratories.  
Pfiesteria is not a virus, fungus, or bacteria. It is not contagious or infectious, and cannot be "caught" like a cold or flu. 
There is no evidence that Pfiesteria-associated illnesses are associated with eating finfish or shellfish. 
Is Pfiesteria related to red and brown tides? 
A few species of algae can become harmful to marine life and to people under certain conditions. Scientists call such 
events "harmful algal blooms." Brown tides, toxic Pfiesteria outbreaks, and some kinds of red tides are all types of 
harmful algal blooms.  
Who should I contact to report fish sores or fish kills? 
A few fish with sores or even a few dead fish are not cause for alarm. However, if you notice a lot of fish -- more than a 
few dozen -- that are dead or dying, have sores, or showing other signs of disease, please contact your state's Pfiesteria 
hotlines: 
Delaware   1-800-523-3336 
Maryland   1-888-584-3110 
North Carolina  1-888-823-6915 
Virginia   1-888-238-6154   30
Text of Insert 
Is it safe to eat seafood? 
YES. In general, it IS safe to eat seafood.  
There has never been a case of illness from eating finfish or shellfish exposed to Pfiesteria. There is no evidence of 
Pfiesteria-contaminated finfish or shellfish on the market. There is no evidence that illnesses related to Pfiesteria are 
associated with eating finfish or shellfish.   
The following common-sense precautions are recommended:  
•  Obey public health advisories.  
•  Do not harvest or consume fish or shellfish from areas that are closed by the state. 
•  Do not handle or consume finfish or shellfish that you have caught that are already dead or dying; that have sores, 
or other signs of disease. 
Is it safe to swim and boat in coastal waters? 
YES. In general, swimming, boating, and other recreational activities in coastal waters ARE generally safe. The 
following common-sense precautions are recommended:  
Obey public health advisories. Do not go into or near the water in areas that are closed by the state.  
If you notice significant numbers of fish that are dead or that have sores, avoid contact with the fish and water, and 
report the incident to your state’s environment or natural resource agency. 
If you have health problems after being exposed to fish, water, or air at the site of a fish kill or suspected toxic 
Pfiesteria outbreak, contact your physician and your state or local public health agency right away. 
What is being done about Pfiesteria? 
State and federal agencies are working closely with local governments and academic institutions to address the 
problems posed by Pfiesteria. Federal agencies involved in the effort include the: 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences 
Food and Drug Administration 
U.S. Geological Survey, and  
U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
Together with state departments of health and natural resources, these agencies are working to:  
•  manage the risk of human health effects by monitoring and rapid response through river closures and public health 
advisories  
•  direct funding and technical expertise to Pfiesteria-related research and monitoring  
•  make current and accurate information widely available to the public, and   
•  understand and address the causes of Pfiesteria outbreaks.   31
Text Describing Fish Kills  
Pfiesteria Associated Fish Kills in the Mid-Atlantic Region 
The following describes what some people consider to be typical Pfiesteria associated fish kills in the Mid-Atantic 
Region 
Major Pfiesteria associated fish kills typically involve hundreds of thousands of fish over large areas of river surface. 
Most of the fish in these kills are menhaden. However edible species such as croaker and flounder may also be found. 
Lesions appear on more than 50% of the menhaden. 
Minor Pfiesteria associated fish kills typically involve less than ten thousand fish over small areas of river surface. All 
of the fish in these kills tend to be menhaden. Lesions appear on more than 50% of the menhaden. 
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Text Describing Seafood Inspection Program 
Seafood Inspection Program of the U.S. Department of Commerce 
The U.S. Department of Commerce (USDC), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) offers a 
voluntary inspection service to seafood producers and processors (under the authority of the Agricultural Marketing 
Act of 1946). The Voluntary Seafood Inspection Program offers a variety of professional inspection services that assure 
compliance with all applicable food regulations.  
USDC Seafood Inspection Program services are provided for a fee. As of October 1, 1999, the basic hourly fee for a 
full-time in-house plant inspector was $49.30.  Services provided by the USDC seafood inspectors are designed to meet 
the needs of the individual producers. Generally, the inspector serves as: 
•  Sanitation advisor: oversees corrections of sanitary practices at the facility 
•  Quality control monitor: observes production to assure a wholesome end product 
•  Official certifier: sample and evaluates final product for U.S. Grade A certification 
Products inspected and certified under the USDC Seafood Inspection Program that meet all of the requirements and 
criteria specified have the U.S. Grade A seal of approval. 
The U.S. Grade A mark signifies that a product meets the highest level of quality established in the applicable U.S. 
grade standard and has been processed under the USDC Voluntary Seafood Inspection Program in a sanitarily approved 
facility. 
A Proposed Mandatory Inspection Program 
Only a small number of seafood producers participate in the voluntary seafood inspection program. The main reason is 
that some businesses think the voluntary seafood inspection program will result in higher prices. It has been proposed 
that the voluntary seafood inspection program become mandatory.  
Seafood producers would be required to pay the fee for a USDC seafood inspector. With the Mandatory Seafood 
Inspection Program you could be sure that all the seafood you ate had the Grade A seal of approval. 
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Text Describing Hypothetical Fish Kill: Minor Kill (in NC) 
A Hypothetical Situation 
Please consider the following hypothetical situation. This press release is based on fish kills that have actually 
happened in the past. But remember, the fish kill that is described did not actually take place. Look on the back of this 
page for the location of the hypothetical fish kill. When we call you back, we’ll talk about this hypothetical situation.  
Press Release 
September 2000 
Last week, scientists responded to reports of dead fish on the lower Pocomoke River. Dead fish were observed over a 
large area of the main portion of the river between Shelltown and Fair Island. The kill was estimated to affect 
approximately 300,000 menhaden, 10,000 croaker and 5,000 flounder. Lesions were observed on over 75% of the 
menhaden. The fish had been dead for at least 24 hours. Other fish in the area were healthy, suggesting conditions that 
caused the kill had ceased. 
Water samples were collected and sent to several laboratories for Pfiesteria analysis. All results to date indicate that 
Pfiesteria was involved in the fish kill. According to a university scientist, two samples showed concentrations of the 
organism at levels high enough to be lethal to fish under certain environmental conditions if the organisms are actively 
releasing toxins.  
As a precaution, until the cause of the fish kill can be determined, it is recommended that you avoid direct body contact 
with the water in the fish kill area; including swimming, water skiing, personal watercraft operation, fishing, clamming, 
crabbing or other recreational water activities. If you fall into the water, change any wet clothing and wash with soap 
and clean water. Keep pets from affected areas. Avoid touching any sores or lesions on the dead or dying fish and do 
not eat dead or dying fish or fish with sores. If you experience any illness that you think could be related to the fish kill, 
contact your physician promptly. 
State officials are working to monitor the situation and collect additional information as needed. 
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Text Describing Hypothetical Fish Kill: Minor Kill (in NC) 
A Hypothetical Situation 
Please consider the following hypothetical situation. This press release is based on fish kills that have actually 
happened in the past. But remember, the fish kill that is described did not actually take place. Look on the back of this 
page for the location of the hypothetical fish kill. When we call you back, we’ll talk about this hypothetical situation. 
Press Release 
September 2000 
Last week, scientists responded to reports of dead fish on the lower Pocomoke River. Dead fish were observed over a 
small area in the main portion of the river between Shelltown and Fair Island. The kill was estimated to affect 
approximately 10,000 menhaden. Lesions were observed on over 50% of the fish. The fish had been dead for at least 24 
hours. Other fish in the area were healthy, suggesting conditions that caused the kill had ceased. 
Water samples were collected and sent to several laboratories for Pfiesteria analysis. All results to date indicate that 
Pfiesteria was involved in the fish kill. According to a university scientist, two samples showed concentrations of the 
organism at levels high enough to be lethal to fish under certain environmental conditions if the organisms are actively 
releasing toxins.  
As a precaution, until the cause of the fish kill can be determined, it is recommended that you avoid direct body contact 
with the water in the fish kill area; including swimming, water skiing, personal watercraft operation, fishing, clamming, 
crabbing or other recreational water activities. If you fall into the water, change any wet clothing and wash with soap 
and clean water. Keep pets from affected areas. Avoid touching any sores or lesions on the dead or dying fish and do 
not eat dead or dying fish or fish with sores. If you experience any illness that you think could be related to the fish kill, 
contact your physician promptly. 
State officials are working to monitor the situation and collect additional information as needed. 
 
 
 
 